By Richard Martin
Attribution and Method
This analysis is based primarily on the daily reporting of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW, www.understanding war.org) covering the US and Israeli campaign against Iran from 28 February to 21 March 2026. ISW provides a consistent, time-sequenced account of targeting, operations, and observed effects across Iran, the Gulf, and associated proxy theatres. The value of this corpus lies not in any single report, but in the cumulative pattern of action it reveals over time.
The interpretive approach follows the principles of Strategic Epistemology and Strategic Praxeology, which treat action as the primary unit of analysis and infer intention from revealed, cost-bearing behaviour rather than from declaratory statements. Strategy is reconstructed from patterns of targeting, sequencing, resource commitment, and observed effects.
This analysis is also informed by the professional military experience described by Colonel (ret.) Kevin C.M. Benson, former J5 Plans of Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), in Expectation of Valor: Planning for the Iraq War (Casemate, 2024). Benson’s account provides a grounded description of the iterative, conditional, and often opaque nature of planning at the political and operational levels.
It is further informed by direct observation of that planning process from my perspective vantage point as Canadian Forces Liaison Officer (CFLO) to CFLCC from mid January to mid April 2003. From that position, it was evident that even in a highly resourced and intensively planned campaign such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, planning was dynamic, assumptions were revisable, and the relationship between political intent and operational execution was not fully transparent at all levels.
The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the structure of the current campaign and infer the likely objectives of the actors involved. All war is simultaneously strategic, operational, and tactical. These are not separate categories of activity but different levels of interpretation applied to the same set of actions.
Introduction
Public commentary on the current war between the United States, Israel, and Iran frequently asserts that the campaign lacks coherence, that planning is incomplete, or that leaders are reacting to events without a clear design. These claims arise naturally in conditions of uncertainty, but they do not withstand disciplined analysis.
When examined through the ISW reporting, the campaign reveals a consistent pattern of action that is structured, cumulative, and directional. At the same time, it exhibits ambiguity, adaptation, and evolving emphasis. These features are often interpreted as evidence of incoherence. In reality, they reflect the constraints under which strategy is formed and executed.
The central argument of this paper is that the campaign is structured and intentional, but not fully visible or fully specified at every level in real time. This is not a flaw in planning. It is the normal condition of warfare conducted at the political-military interface.
The Observable Campaign
From the opening strikes on 28 February, the campaign displayed a clear structure. ISW identified three primary lines of effort: suppression of Iranian air defences, degradation of retaliatory capabilities, and disruption of command and control. These lines of effort persisted throughout the reporting period.
The initial phase focused on air defence systems, missile launchers, missile bases, drone infrastructure, and senior leadership. This produced two immediate effects. First, it enabled sustained coalition access to Iranian airspace. Second, it reduced Iran’s ability to generate coordinated missile and drone attacks.
By early March, ISW reporting indicates that a significant portion of Iran’s missile launch capability had been degraded and that Iranian retaliatory attacks were less coordinated and less effective than expected. This demonstrates a direct relationship between targeting and outcome. The coalition did not simply strike targets. It degraded an integrated system.
The campaign then expanded into the maritime domain. US and Israeli forces struck Iranian naval assets, coastal missile units, and infrastructure associated with mine-laying and shipping disruption. These actions correspond directly to Iran’s established strategy of threatening maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and imposing economic costs through disruption of energy flows.
At the same time, the campaign expanded into the regime’s internal security architecture. ISW reports repeated strikes on Basij bases, Law Enforcement Command facilities, Sarallah Headquarters, and intelligence nodes. Later strikes included the Supreme National Security Council, the Presidential Office, and the Assembly of Experts. These targets are central to regime control, coordination, and legitimacy.
The campaign therefore moved from suppressing outward military capability to degrading internal control and decision-making. This progression is cumulative and structured, not random.
Iranian and Allied Objectives
Iran’s actions across the reporting period display a coherent strategic pattern.
Iran has conducted missile and drone attacks against Israel, US forces, and GCC states. It has targeted energy infrastructure, ports, and maritime traffic. It has activated proxy forces, including Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. It has implemented internal control measures, including internet restrictions, surveillance, and arrests.
From these actions, several objectives can be inferred. The first Iranian objective is to impose costs on the United States, Israel, and their regional partners. By targeting energy infrastructure and shipping, Iran seeks to generate economic pressure that translates into political pressure.
The second Iranian objective is to expand the conflict horizontally. By striking GCC states and activating proxies, Iran seeks to widen the battlespace and complicate coalition decision-making.
The third Iranian objective is to ensure regime survival. Internal repression measures indicate that the regime views internal stability as a critical vulnerability and is acting to maintain control.
The fourth Iranian objective is to compel a ceasefire before decisive degradation or regime collapse occurs. Iranian attacks on Gulf infrastructure are consistently framed as efforts to impose costs sufficient to force an early termination of the campaign.
Iran’s allies support these objectives by increasing the number of active fronts and raising the cost of sustained operations for the coalition.
Coalition Objectives
The objectives of the United States and Israel can be inferred from the pattern of their actions.
The primary coalition objective is to render Iran incapable of sustained offensive action. This is reflected in the systematic destruction of missile launchers, missile bases, drone infrastructure, air defence systems, and associated logistics and production capabilities.
The secondary coalition objective is to defeat Iran’s regional coercion strategy. This includes protecting Gulf energy infrastructure, maintaining maritime flow through the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing Iran from using economic disruption as leverage.
The tertiary coalition objective is to degrade the regime’s internal coherence and capacity for control. Strikes on internal security forces, leadership, and decision-making institutions indicate an effort to reduce the regime’s ability to coordinate and sustain itself under pressure.
A fourth coalition objective, supported by cumulative targeting patterns, is to create conditions for regime change without committing to immediate occupation. This is not a formally declared objective but is consistent with the effects sought through the campaign.
These objectives are pursued concurrently, with shifting emphasis rather than rigid sequencing.
The Role of the GCC
The GCC states occupy a structurally complex position. They are targets of Iranian attacks and participants in the broader security architecture.
Their behaviour is best described as defensively aligned but politically cautious. GCC states have defended their territory, supported air defence integration, and contributed to maritime security. At the same time, they have avoided full political alignment with the campaign and have resisted escalation into offensive operations.
This reflects competing pressures. They face direct threats from Iran, rely on US security guarantees, and seek to avoid uncontrolled escalation that could destabilize their own systems.
Their actions support coalition objectives in practice while preserving political flexibility.
Planning Under Constraint
The apparent ambiguity of the campaign reflects the conditions under which it is conducted.
At the political level, leaders must preserve freedom of action. This includes managing escalation risk, maintaining alliances, protecting economic stability, and allocating military resources globally. As a result, political objectives are often conditional and not fully specified in public.
At the military level, planners translate this conditional intent into executable operations. Planning is iterative, assumptions are revisable, and execution adapts to unfolding conditions.
At the observer level, only fragments are visible. Observers do not see the full set of constraints, assumptions, or decision frameworks. This produces a perception of incoherence.
Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a relevant comparison. It is often viewed as a highly planned campaign, yet accounts from within the system tell a more complex story.
As described by Benson in Expectation of Valor, planning within CFLCC was continuous, adaptive, and conditioned by evolving political guidance. From my vantage point as the CFLO to CFLCC during that period, it was evident that even at the height of preparation, planning was not static or fully settled. There were constant adjustments, incomplete visibility of political intent at lower levels, and ongoing refinement of operational concepts.
What appears coherent in retrospect did not necessarily appear so during execution. This demonstrates that coherence is often reconstructed after the fact rather than experienced in full in real time.
Anticipation and Adaptation
Claims that the coalition was surprised by Iranian actions are not supported by the observable pattern of operations.
From the outset, the coalition targeted missile systems, naval assets, and infrastructure associated with maritime disruption. These are precisely the tools Iran would use to expand the conflict and threaten shipping.
This indicates anticipation rather than surprise. It does not imply perfect prediction. The scale, speed, and difficulty of Iranian actions may have exceeded expectations. This is common in warfare. It does not indicate the absence of planning.
Strategic campaigns are designed to adapt. They anticipate likely enemy actions and respond through prepared options and evolving execution.
Conclusion
The campaign against Iran, as revealed through ISW reporting, is structured, cumulative, and strategically directed. It is not fully visible or fully specified at every level in real time. This is a consequence of operating under constraint, not a failure of planning.
Iran seeks to impose costs, expand the conflict, and preserve regime survival. The coalition seeks to degrade Iran’s offensive capability, defeat its regional coercion strategy, and weaken regime coherence.
The apparent ambiguity of the campaign reflects the interaction of political intent, military execution, and limited external visibility. It does not indicate the absence of strategy.
The correct analytical model is this. Strategic campaigns consist of structured intent operating under constraint, executed through adaptive operations, and observed through incomplete information. When this model is applied, claims of incoherence or haphazard planning are not supported. They reflect a misunderstanding of how war is actually conducted.
© 2026 Richard Martin | The Strategic Code
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